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 War Elephants and Early Tanks: 
A Transepochal Comparison of Ancient and Modern Warfare 
 
ALARIC SEARLE 
 
 
 
 
One of the most influential military historians of the twentieth century, and the first theorist 
of tank warfare, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, maintained throughout his life an interest in 
ancient warfare. Alexander the Great, in particular, represented an ongoing field of enquiry in 
his consideration of military history from antiquity to the present on which he had begun to 
publish during the interwar period. 1  Well into his eighties, Fuller wrote an analysis of 
Alexander the Great’s qualities as a military leader. In the foreword, he asserted: ‘Happily, in 
this study of Alexander’s generalship I am not called upon to be a Quellenforscher, because 
the art of war – certainly in its essentials – was the same in Alexander’s day as it is now.’2 
Although certainly a controversial statement, it would be a mistake to dismiss this claim as 
the ill-considered speculations of a general in retirement – the concept which lay behind the 
book had matured in his mind over a thirty-year period.3 But one of the intriguing points here 
is that, for all he wrote about the precursors of the tank, he never saw war elephants in that 
                                                          
1 See the following articles by J.F.C. Fuller: ‘The Sieges of Alexander the Great’, Royal Engineers Journal, 39 
(March 1925), pp. 103-10; ‘The Decisive Battles of Alexander the Great’, Cavalry Journal, 15, Part I (April 
1925), pp. 137-56, Part II (July 1925), pp. 331-45, Part III (October 1925), pp. 443-56; ‘The Small Wars of 
Alexander the Great’, Cavalry Journal, 17, Part I (January 1927), pp. 42-55, Part II (April 1927), pp. 184-99; 
‘The Grand Strategy of Alexander the Great’, RAF Quarterly, 3, Part I (January 1932), pp. 1-17, Part II (April 
1932), pp. 153-63. 
2 J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (New Brunswick, NJ, 1960), p. 7.  
3 King’s College London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter, LHCMA), Captain Sir Basil 
Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/302/493, Fuller to Liddell Hart, 9 December 1959. For further details, see Brian 
Holden Reid, ‘British Military Intellectuals and the Lure of Antiquity’, in idem, Studies in British Military 
Thought: Debates with Fuller & Liddell Hart (Lincoln, Nebr., 1998), pp. 206-28.  
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role, viewing the tank essentially as a war machine and, hence, a human invention, marking a 
distinct departure from human and animal muscular power.4 
 Even the most recent studies on the history of the tank and military mechanization 
generally approach the subject as historians have done since the early writings of Fuller. The 
history of the tank is seen as, in essence, a history of the invention of a new weapon. In his 
most recent history of the tank, Richard Ogorkiewicz discusses the precursors very much in 
the same terms as Fuller. The ‘origin of the species’, as he puts it colourfully, lay in steam-
powered vehicles. While some inspiration for the invention of the tank was provided by H.G. 
Wells’ short-story of 1903, ‘The Land Ironclads’, the vehicle of his imagination was only 
steam-powered, whereas around the same time the internal combustion engine became the 
true basis for making guns mobile.5 Bruce Gudmundsson in his study of ‘armour’, also begins 
with the invention of machines, although he does include the development of armoured cars, 
and combines this dimension with the importance of ideas and combined-arms formations.6 
Markus Pöhlmann, on the other hand, offers a different perspective, identifying military 
culture as an explanation for German attitudes before July 1914, and during the war, to 
military technology. He argues that the German High Command adopted a rational approach, 
best described as that of the ‘later adopter’; there was little point in investing resources in 
largely untried and very new technology until it was clear that it offered a viable alternative 
to existing weapons and methods.7  
                                                          
4 J.F.C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918 (London, 1920), esp. pp. 297-307; see also, Anon. [J.F.C. 
Fuller], ‘The Influence of Tanks on Military Operations’, Ministry of Munitions Journal, 2, No. 25 (December 
1918), pp. 346-48. 
5 Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution (Oxford, 2015), pp. 11-21. For another example of 
the traditional explanations of ‘origins’, see David Fletcher, ‘The Origins of Armour’, in J.P. Harris and F.N. 
Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare (London, 1990), pp. 5-26. 
6 Bruce Gudmundsson, On Armor (Westport, CT, 2004), pp. 1-33. 
7 Markus Pöhlmann, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Krieges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis 1945 
(Paderborn, 2016), pp. 19-48, and, idem, ‘Images of War, Armament and Mechanization in Imperial Germany, 
1880-1914’, in Alaric Searle (ed.), Genesis, Employment, Aftermath: First World War Tanks and the New 
Warfare, 1900-1945 (Solihull, 2015), pp. 13-30. 
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Regardless of whether one looks to scholarly studies of the history of mechanization, 
or more popular works, the tank has usually been placed within a narrative which sees its 
invention as a ‘turning point’ in the history of warfare, a ‘revolution’ in methods and the start 
of a ‘new epoch’.8 Thus, despite occasional passing references to war elephants – such as, 
that by the reign of Ptomely II (285-246 BC), they were ‘essential war machines, the 
armoured tanks of their day’9 – no serious consideration has been given to a comparison 
between the employment of elephants and tanks in war. A recent revival in interest in the 
history of strategy, however, suggests that more serious thought could be invested in 
considering whether there are broad principles of strategy which exist as apolitical entities, 
independently of epoch, political system and cultural attitudes to warfare:10 and, one route 
into this complex issue could be through a comparison of war elephants and tanks. 
 Perhaps because J.F.C. Fuller, the military historian one would have thought most 
likely to draw parallels between war elephants and tanks, never drew any such comparisons, 
possible similarities between tanks and war elephants remain unexplored territory for military 
historians. 11  Still, the similarities do seem to be substantial enough to justify further 
investigation. War elephants, which were employed on battlefields from ancient times well 
into the middle ages, and which were used as heavy assault weapons, can be compared with 
some of the tanks used in the first half of the twentieth century. War elephants were mobile, 
                                                          
8 Among other precursors of tanks which have been mentioned in the literature by ‘tank pioneers’, early 
advocates and more popular works are war chariots and knights in armour: E.H. Tennyson D’Encourt, British 
Tanks, paper read at meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Bournemouth, 10 
September 1919 (London, 1919), p. 1; B.H. Liddell Hart, ‘Medieval Cavalry and Modern Tanks’, English 
Review, 40 (July 1925), pp. 83-96; and, H.C.B. Rogers, Tanks in Battle (London, 1965), pp. 11-30, who does 
mention war elephants, but whose account is entirely descriptive and does not draw comparisons with tanks.  
9 Jacke Phillips, ‘Punt and Aksum: Egypt and the Horn of Africa’, Journal of African History, 38 (November 
1997), pp. 423-57, quote, 446-47. See also the comments in J. Peddie, The Roman War Machine (Stroud, 1994), 
pp. 86-87.  
10 Some recent studies of strategy from a military-historical perspective are: Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of 
Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge, 2010); John Stone, Military Strategy: The 
Politics and Technique of War (London, 2011); Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York, 2013); 
Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2013). 
11 It is curious that probably the first comparison of the two weapons was drawn in a satirical poem, published in 
a German publication, Kladderatsch, on 5 November 1916. It compared Hannibal’s elephants with ‘Haig’s 
tanks’, but was largely intended to ridicule the new weapon. Pöhlmann, Mechanisierung des Krieges, p. 112. 
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projectiles could be fired directly from them into the enemy infantry in close proximity, while 
the elephants could exert considerable psychological effect on their opponents. These factors 
are but some of the more obvious parallels which can be drawn between war elephants and 
early tanks. 
 Any attempt to compare two very different ‘weapons systems’, each operating at 
different stages of military technological development, and within radically different societal 
contexts and alliance systems, will immediately face questions about methodology. 
Comparative historical analysis, itself, has been for many years the preserve of sociologists 
and political scientists, very often interested in quantitative approaches. Political parties, 
economic trends, ideologies and revolutions are among some of the concerns of their research 
agendas. 12  Within the overlapping fields of military history and ‘war and society’, 
comparative studies have focused on combat power, military effectiveness and societies at 
war, though some work on military doctrine has also been undertaken. The key point here is 
that this work usually compares relatively similar societies, armies, concepts and mentalities 
within the same historical era.13 
 This comparative investigation will, however, attempt to draw comparisons which cut 
dramatically across historical epochs. The basis for this will not only be to investigate further 
interesting parallels to be found between ancient and modern warfare, but the ‘device’ of 
referring to both war elephants and tanks as ‘weapons systems’ will provide the basis for the 
comparison. Although the reader, like the theatre audience, is being asked to ‘suspend belief’ 
in the interests of the comparison, there is some justification for referring to war elephants 
                                                          
12 Some good expositions of approaches can be found in James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 2003).  
13 Among the best examples of some of these comparative approaches are: Allan R. Millett & Williamson 
Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness: Vol. 1: The First World War (Cambridge, 1998); Alexander Watson, 
Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 
(Cambridge, 2008); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between 
the World Wars (Ithaca & London, 1984); Elizabeth Keir, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine 
between the Wars (Princeton, NJ, 1997); Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army 
Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT, 1982); and, Dietmar Süß, Tod aus der Luft: Kriegsgesellschaft und 
Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England (Munich, 2011).  
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and tanks – albeit very loosely – as ‘weapons systems’. While there appears to be no 
universally accepted definition in international law, according to one offered by the Geneva 
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights:  
 
A weapons system is a device or coordinated set of devices or objects that consists of 
one or more weapons and a means of delivery as well as integral equipment and 
materiel. A weapons system is distinguished from a weapon in that while it 
incorporates one or more weapons in many instances it can also be used for other 
purposes than killing, injuring, disorienting, or threatening a person or inflicting 
damage on a physical object. For instance, an aircraft can conduct surveillance and a 
ship can transport personnel and materiel.14 
 
 
Thus, a tank usually mounts a cannon and a machine-gun, or affords the crew the 
ability to supplement the firepower on the vehicle itself, yet it can be used to transport 
supplies, wounded soldiers or communications equipment. By the same logic, a war elephant 
could transport archers into battle, for instance, but it could also be employed for logistic 
purposes. While the term weapons system not only suggests the ‘platform’ for the 
employment of more than one weapon, the ‘system’ requires – due to its complexity – a form 
of support structure different to that of the individual soldier with a hand-held weapon. 
Finally, for the purposes of the comparison, it needs to be pointed out that the symbolism 
with which an individual weapon can be invested is of a rather different nature to a weapons 
system, as the latter is operated by a ‘crew’ rather than one soldier.15 
In order to delve deeper into this subject, then, four comparisons will be undertaken: 
first, a general comparison of the two weapons systems; second, their employment in war; 
third, the tactical and operational functions of the two weapons; and, fourth, their role as 
                                                          
14 http://www.weaponslaw.org/glossary/weapons-system; accessed 9 February 2017. According to the US 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (edition of 15 December 2016), a ‘weapon 
system’ is: ‘A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, 
and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.’ See the online edition at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf, p. 253; accessed 9 February 2017. Thus, in 
contemporary military and security literature, the terms ‘weapon system’ and ‘weapons system’ are used with 
little real distinction drawn between the two. The latter term will be preferred throughout this article. 
15 On the symbolism of weapons in general, see Urte Evert, Die Eisenbraut: Symbolgeschichte der militärischen 
Waffe von 1700 bis 1945 (Münster, 2015). 
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symbols of military and state power. This comparative exercise will provide a platform for an 
analysis of two related issues: on the one hand, why J.F.C. Fuller was so reluctant to draw 
any parallels between the two weapons; and, on the other, what general observations can be 
drawn from the comparison. Some final reflections will be offered on Fuller’s claim that the 
essential elements of the art of war have not changed since ancient times, considering in turn 
what this transepochal analytical exercise suggests about the nature of strategy.  
 
I. The Two ‘Weapons Systems’ 
The basis for this comparison lies in some interesting parallels which can be drawn between 
war elephants and early armoured vehicles. Tanks built during the First World War, or 
improvised armoured vehicles, such as the ‘Bison’ in the Second World War, or home-made 
Kurdish armoured vehicles built in haste for use in combat against the so-called ‘Islamic 
State’, were all ‘primitive’ enough to enable a realistic comparison of these two ‘weapons 
systems’ to be undertaken.16 The first dimension to the comparison is that both weapons went 
through a process of development (although each at a different pace), which in its initial 
phase allowed relatively simple weapons to surprise an unprepared opponent, although the 
possibility of disaster was ever present. 17  Where the comparison becomes particularly 
interesting is when we include the complexities of both weapons systems in relation to the 
interaction between the ‘crews’ and the weapon itself. The first difficulty for the driver of the 
                                                          
16 It could be argued that once armoured vehicles were equipped with, first, both cannon and machine-guns in 
their turrets, then subsequently the 75mm cannon (Panzer IV) and 76mm cannon (T-34), their technological 
development had reached a point whereby their main strength was their long-range gun. Thus, the comparison 
can only be undertaken in the case of vehicles in the first phase of the tank’s evolution. 
17 On 1 October 331 BC, for example, according to one version, a group of elephants intended for use by Darius 
against Alexander was unable to take to the field as they had been awake all night; it has been speculated they 
had become extremely restless, which had disturbed Darius’ cavalry, so they needed to be removed from the 
battle. John M. Kistler, War Elephants (Lincoln, Nebr., & London 2007), pp. 28-31. An instance of disaster in 
the employment of an untried tank unit was the first employment of 12 Renault FT-17 tanks by the Spanish 
Army on 18 March 1922 against Rif tribesmen. The tanks advanced beyond the infantry, some of their machine-
guns jammed, two broke down, tribesmen pushed knives through the vision slits, and the other machines were 
forced to withdraw. J.E. Alvarez, ‘Tank Warfare during the Rif Rebellion, 1921-1927’, Armor, 106 (Jan/Feb 
1997), pp. 26-28. 
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elephant, the mahout, lay in giving signals to the animal so that it could be controlled in battle. 
In First World War tanks, complexity was to be found in the challenges of operating the gun 
or machine-guns, and in steering. In other words, training formed the basis for successful 
employment in war in the case of both weapons.18 
 To consider the subject in more detail, let us begin with the war elephant. Unlike the 
situation today, where the elephant is threatened with extinction, caused by illegal hunting 
and a disappearing habitat, in the ancient world there were plenty of elephants which could be 
caught. For the purposes of war, wild elephants were preferred over those which had been 
raised in captivity because an elephant taken from the wild was more aggressive and far 
cheaper than a calf which took over twenty years before it had fully grown; and, anyway, 
after twenty years it had become too domesticated, so could only be used for the carrying of 
war material or supplies. The necessity of employing an elephant captured in the wild meant 
that the temperament of the animal was an essential prerequisite for its use in battle. In 
addition, since elephants demonstrated a high level of intelligence, they could be trained to 
perform a range of tasks.19 
 In contrast to the other animal frequently employed in war in antiquity, the horse, 
which could be trained for clashes on the battlefield, elephants have been the only animal 
which have fought for humans in war as opposed to performing a few basic tasks.20 We are 
talking here principally about male elephants. In addition to charging opponents, which was 
all horses could perform, elephants could trample enemy soldiers, at the same time they could 
                                                          
18 On the challenge of steering the British Mark I, see D.G. Browne, The Tank in Action (London, 1920), pp. 19-
21; for the training of the British Tank Corps in France, J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier 
(London, 1936), pp. 87-112, and, University Archives & Special Collections, Rutgers University, NJ, Major-
General J.F.C. Fuller Papers, box 14, HQ, Tank Corps, G.S.943. Instructions for the Training of the Tank Corps 
in France (British Army Printing & Stationary Services, 1 December 1917); for the training of elephants, Kistler, 
War Elephants, pp. 9-13. 
19 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. ix-xii; C.A. Spinage, Elephants (London, 1994); Gary Haynes, Mammoths, 
Mastodonts, and Elephants: Biology, Behaviour, and the Fossil Record (Cambridge, 1991); Edward B. Barbier, 
Elephants, Economics, and Ivory (London, 1990). 
20 For a complete overview of the employment of animals in war, see: Jared Eglan, Beasts of War: The 
Militarization of Animals (St Raleigh, NC, 2015); and, Rainer Pöppinghege (ed.), Tiere im Krieg von der Antike 
bis zur Gegegenwart (Paderborn, 2009), esp. pp. 7-31. 
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employ their tusks, trunks, head, legs and the mass of their bodies in close combat. When 
charging, they could be remarkably fast. But what characterizes elephants in the history of 
war has been their capacity to follow a variety of relatively complex instructions from their 
mahout.21 In fact, the interaction between mahout and elephant can be compared with the 
tasks performed by a fighter pilot or tank driver. 
 While the intention here is not to overplay the comparison, it is possible to discern 
some of the contours of the theories of the sociologists of technology in relation to the 
process of a soldier controlling a complex, modern, mobile weapons system in the 
relationship between mahout and war elephant. Indeed, parallel to the observations of 
historians of technology, that the pilot or tank commander never had absolute control over the 
technology he was operating, the mahout likewise could never be certain that the elephant 
would follow all his instructions during a battle. Furthermore, with the emergence of a new 
military elite of technicians through air squadrons and tank divisions in the mid-twentieth 
century, characterized by specific knowledge and skills, a comparison can be made with the 
‘special units’ of elephant troops in armies of the antique, not least of all as the elephant had 
the capacity to render chariots obsolete.22  
 A further and important basis for a comparison of elephants and tanks can be 
identified in the weapons and armour with which some elephants began to be equipped. At 
first, this was simply the positioning of archers and spear throwers on the back of the animals, 
which directed their projectiles at enemy infantry. Later, at the latest by the first century BC, 
baskets or ‘towers’ (howdahs) were fixed on the backs of the pachyderms, so the archers 
                                                          
21 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. 9, 23, 193-94, 214-16. Biologists have for many decades debated possible 
parallels between human and animal aggression, but it is generally held that aggressiveness in animals is very 
different to that which is found in homo sapiens. See, for instance, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, The Biology of Peace 
and War: Men, Animals and Aggression (London, 1979).  
22 Werner Rammert, Technik und Sozialtheorie (Berlin, 1998); Trevor Pinch & Nelly Oudshoorn (eds.), How 
Users Matter: The Co-construction of Users and Technology (London, 2003); Jost Halfmann (ed.), 
Theoriebausteine der Techniksoziologie (Frankfurt am Main/New York, 1995); and, Gavin de Beer, Hannibal: 
The Struggle for Power in the Mediterranean (London, 1974), p. 101. 
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were not so precariously perched on the elephant when taking aim, not to mention giving 
them a more protected firing platform. Still later, armour was developed to provide protection 
for the head of the elephant. Metal strips were sometimes bound around the legs of the animal 
so that one of their most vulnerable points was covered. Hence, although the term ‘weapons 
system’ can only be given in inverted commas in the case of war elephants, some of the 
features in the early development of the tank can be recognized, not least of all in the 
continual improvement in protection, best described as ‘up-armouring’.23 
 Of course, the technical development of the first tanks during the Great War was more 
rapid, measurable in a period of less than four years, even if characterized by the limitations 
of the first combat machines. The first British tank, the Mark I, had a theoretical speed of 
3.65 mph, but travelled more slowly over open terrain. Its successor design, the Mark IV was 
unable to achieve any improvements in terms of speed, even if the Mark V did manage to 
reach 4.6 mph. In other words, elephants were still able to outstrip the early tanks in terms of 
rapidity of advance. Nonetheless, if one looks at some of the Kurdish home-made vehicles 
which have appeared in the fighting in Syria since 2011 based around rubbish-disposal lorries 
and other civilian vehicles, higher speeds were achieved, albeit combined with modest 
firepower. This said, the British Medium A ‘Whippet’ tank which appeared in France in 1918 
achieved a speed of 8.3 mph. There were other armoured vehicles in this period – the Rolls 
Royce Armoured Car, for example, had a maximum speed on roads of 45 mph – which were 
considerably faster than tanks, but unable to negotiate rough terrain.24 
 The French produced three types of tank during the First World War: the Schneider 
CA1 was slightly faster than the British heavy tanks, with a speed of 5 mph; the Saint-
Chamond managed 8 mph on road, less over rough terrain; even the light Renault FT-17, 
                                                          
23 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. 21-23, 27, 50-51, 157-58, 195. 
24 David Fletcher, British Mark I Tank 1916 (Oxford, 2004), p. 29; David Fletcher, British Mark IV Tank 
(Oxford, 2007), p. 28; David Fletcher, Mark V Tank (Oxford, 2011), p. 27; and, Bryn Hammond, ‘Practical 
Considerations in British Tank Operations on the Western Front, 1916-1918’, in Searle (ed.), First World War 
Tanks, pp. 31-56. 
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which was much faster on roads, could only manage 4.3 mph over the battlefield. The 
German A7V, of which only twenty were ever produced, managed 15 km/h on roads, but had 
poor cross-country mobility. The French Schneider and Saint-Chamond suffered from a 
variety of technical defects, while the A7V could topple over if it drove up an incline at the 
wrong angle. Thus, these weaknesses indicate parallels with war elephants in battle, not least 
of all the progressive attempts to add armour and counteract some of the other 
vulnerabilities.25 
 The conditions for the crews of all First World War tanks, whether British, French or 
German, were taxing. In the case of British tanks, the Marks I, IV and V, eight men had to 
fight and operate the tank in cramped conditions, the earlier models subjecting them to 
carbon monoxide poisoning and intense heat. During combat action, enemy fire made it too 
dangerous to open any of the hatches. Furthermore, driving a tank was extremely strenuous: 
in the British machines, the driver sat at the front to steer, while the commander attempted to 
give signals through sign language, while in the rear of the machine two crew members 
operated the gears. While source material for ancient warfare is obviously limited in 
comparison to documents from the Great War, it seems reasonable to assume that 
communication between soldiers positioned on top of an elephant would have been at least 
for some of the time reduced to hand signals due to the general tumult of battle. 26 
Interestingly, a similar solution to the communications problem was developed in the case of 
both weapons systems: by the sixth century BC, one in ten war elephants had become a signal 
                                                          
25 Olivier Lahaie, ‘The Development of French Tank Warfare on the Western Front, 1916-1918’, in Searle (ed.), 
First World War Tanks, pp. 57-79; S.J. Zaloga, The French Renault Light Tank (London, 1988); S.J. Zaloga, 
German Panzers 1914-1918 (Oxford, 2006); and, Ralf Raths, ‘From the Bremerwagen to the A7V: German 
Tank Production and Armoured Warfare, 1916-1918’, in Searle (ed.), First World War Tanks, pp. 80-107. 
26 Bryn Hammond, ‘Practical Considerations in British Tank Operations’, pp. 31-56, esp. 39-46. 
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elephant; in the second half of 1917, both the British and the French employed signal tanks 
for the first time during Third Ypres and the Battle of Malmaison, respectively.27 
 So, it can be asserted, that the limitations experienced in the early tank actions do 
suggest that a comparison of early twentieth-century military technology with war elephants 
can be made in terms of the experience of the crews and drivers in battle. Both ‘weapons 
systems’ experienced certain limitations, obviously taking into account the differing levels of 
military technological development in each case, but both still possessed certain advantages 
over the other arms if employed correctly and especially whenever surprise could be 
exploited. Both ‘weapons systems’ also possessed enough flexibility to be able to influence 
specific encounters on the battlefield, not to mention creating a psychological advantage for 
the attacker. From general observations, the comparison now needs to move to more specific 
details, in the first instance to the actual employment of both weapons in war. 
 
II. Employment in War 
Among the most significant battles28 in which elephants were employed were Arbela in 331 
BC, where Darius Codomannus reputedly used 15 elephants against Alexander the Great. 
Five years later Porus employed around 200 elephants in a battle against Alexander near 
Chillianwalla; yet despite furious fighting, Alexander emerged victorious. During the battle 
of Ipsus in 301 BC, 400 elephants took part in the fighting when Seleucus, one of 
Alexander’s generals, fought against Demetrius. Seleucus successor, Antiochus I, created a 
mass panic among the cavalry of the Gauls (a force of around 40,000) in 280 BC using 
pachyderms; in 273 BC, at the ‘Elephant Victory’, he reputedly only used 16 elephants. Some 
                                                          
27 Kistler, War Elephants, p. 23; Brian N. Hall, ‘The Development of Tank Communications in the British 
Expeditionary Force, 1916-1918’, in Searle (ed.), First World War Tanks, pp. 136-62, esp. 148-52; Tim Gale, 
The French Army’s Tank Force and Armoured Warfare in the Great War: The Artillerie Spéciale (Farnham, 
2013), p. 88. 
28 Useful as an introduction to battles are: the reprinted article, Major-General Sir John Moore, ‘Elephants in 
War’, Canadian Veterinary Journal, 27 (1986), pp. 312-13; and, Duncan Head, Armies of the Macedonian and 
Punic Wars: Organisation, Tactics, Dress and Weapons (Goring-on-Sea, 1982), pp. 35, 63-84. 
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of the greatest successes of elephants were based on their effects on horses. The 
Carthaginians first encountered elephants in Sicily; they must have become convinced of 
their value as by 262 BC they had established their own elephant forces. During the first 
Punic Wars, the army of the Carthaginians used elephants against the Romans near Palermo, 
who defended themselves against the animals with burning arrows. This created such 
complete panic among them that they trampelled many of their own infantry to death. Zama 
in 202 BC saw a further victory of the Romans against elephants, this time in battle against 
Hannibal. 
 It is also worth mentioning that the use of elephants in war has been identified in India 
as early as 1000 BC, where they were frequently employed by rulers in Assam. Moreover, the 
method of directing an elephant through a stick with a hook attached to the end began in 
India; indeed, the utilization of elephants was much more pronounced there than in the West. 
When war elephants had ceased to be used in the Mediterranean region, they continued to be 
employed in south Asia in armies for logistic purposes, especially in mountainous areas, 
where they were used for transport across passes and rivers. One reason for the use of the 
animal may have been that the climate and terrain in India was not conducive to the breeding 
of horses, so the large numbers of elephants available guaranteed their place in armies. 
Among the examples of the successful employment of elephants in the region are, for 
instance, when Kaiser Cyrus conquered the Punjab in 331 BC. It has been speculated that 
Alexander’s expansion east of the Punjab was not continued due to the existence of an army 
of 8,000 elephants which was possessed by Kaiser Nanda.29 
                                                          
29 Kaushik Roy, ‘Use of Elephants in Indian Warfare (1000 BCE – 1943 CE)’, in Daniel Coetzee & Lee W. 
Eysturlid (eds.), Philosophers of War: The Evolution of History’s Greatest Military Thinkers. Volume 1: The 
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Not nearly enough is known about war elephants in ancient and medieval China, but it 
seems they were employed far less than in India.30 Apparently, the Shang Dynasty made use 
of war elephants before 1000 BC, but their employment remained geographically restricted. 
In 506 BC, the Chu army attempted to break a siege by the Wu army by attaching lighted 
torches to the tails of elephants; but this stratagem failed. In fact, in northern China, elephant 
populations began to decline. Hence, although herds of wild elephants could still be observed 
roaming in the sixth century, only a few other examples of military use have been discovered 
before the tenth century, perhaps because sound counter-measures were known. During the 
campaign against the Champa kingdom in Spring 605 AD, a Sui army faced war elephants in 
its drive south; following initial reverses, covered pits were employed to ensnare the 
elephants, while crossbows were used successfully against them. The only army to have 
maintained them was in the state of Southern Han (917-971 AD), with its capital in Canton. 
They successfully employed an elephant corps against the state of Chu in 948, but were 
defeated by Sing cross-bowmen in 971. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongol Khans, 
with their capital at Peking, maintained several thousand elephants as part of their military 
establishment. Thereafter, their main use appears to have been for ceremonial duties. It was 
reported by a nineteenth-century British writer, for instance, that, in 1598, the Emperor in 
Peking had proudly displayed sixty elephants to visitors, all extravagantly clothed and 
decorated, but these were obviously for ceremonial purposes.31 
In the wake of the Roman advances into Parthia and Mesopotamia (53-119 AD), the 
emergence of the Sassanid Persian Empire (224-651 AD) saw further employment of war 
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elephants. The Sassanians, who inherited parts of their military system from the Persians, 
created their own elephant corps, although the shock troops were those of the heavy, 
armoured cavalry. Indian elephants tended to be deployed to the rear of their armies, although 
some evidence suggests they were also used in surprise attacks. The Sassanian army was a 
multi-ethnic force, including Iranians and Mongolian Chionite-Ephthalites; the elephant 
mahouts were from India. Clashes with Roman armies were frequent; at a battle at Suma (363 
AD), elephants initially caused the dislocation of a Roman column, which was exploited by 
bowmen and lancers, but they were then driven off by reinforcements, suffering additional 
pachyderm losses in the process. The retention of the Sassanian elephant corps, and its 
continued employment, suggests that elephants must have continued to be useful, despite the 
importance of both heavy and light cavalry, up until the high water-mark of the Sassanid 
Persian Empire around 620 AD, not least of all for their symbolic value for the dynasty.32 
 The eventual disappearance of elephants from the battlefield was the result of specific 
tactical-technical developments; it seems likely that by the sixth century elephants’ primary 
functions in war had been reduced to logistics and sieges.33 Arab armies, which mounted 
archers on horse-back, were too fast and mobile for the elephant formations from India. In 
June 712 AD, 6,000 Syrian cavalrymen annihilated Daher’s elephant-dominated army. New 
bows had changed the tactical balance because arrows could now penetrate elephant hide. 
Moslem cavalry became much more effective through the invention of horse shoes which 
were nailed into place. Despite this development, elephants were still integrated by the 
Turco-Mongols into their army as they expanded into India to found the Mughal Empire. It 
was, however, the discovery of gunpowder which marked the end of the employment of war 
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elephants in battle: the last large-scale appearance of elephants was on 5 November 1556 AD 
during the second battle of Panipat.34 Still, despite their decreasing use in the medieval period, 
war elephants played far more than merely a secondary role in ancient warfare. 
 If we turn to the appearance of tanks during the First World War, they were employed 
principally on the Western Front. The first combat action occurred on 15 September 1916, 
when just over 20 British tanks managed to leave the start line during the engagement at 
Flers-Coucelette during the Battle of the Somme in what was a first test for tanks. Although 
the success was modest, around 400 German infantrymen were captured. The first French 
tank action came on 16 April 1917 during the Battle of Chemin des Dames during the ill-
fated Nivelle Offensive. Many tanks were put out of action by artillery fire, others had their 
technical deficiencies ruthlessly exposed in the course of the battle; in total, 57 tanks were 
lost. While the early actions brought rather poor results, the first mass attack of British tanks 
came on 20 November 1917 when the British III and IV Corps launched a bold attack in the 
direction of the major rail-junction at Cambrai. In total, 378 combat tanks were thrown into 
the battle; wide German trenches were overcome through the use of fascines, bundles of 
wood bound together and released from the nose of the tank into the trench to allow the tank 
to cross. Although the initial gains made by the British were largely negated by a daring 
German counter-attack, Cambrai demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt the future 
possibilities of the new weapon. Thus, during the decisive battles of the Allied counter-
offensives in the second half of 1918, tanks played a key role in breaking the resistance of the 
German Army on the Western Front.35 
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 A handful of tanks were also tested during the Second and Third Battles of Gaza in 
Palestine in 1917. Although on both occasions only eight tanks were employed, the 
experience did demonstrate that tanks could be used under desert conditions. Furthermore, 
the British sent 150 tanks to the White Russian Army under General Anton Denikin during 
the Russian Civil War, 1919-21. Five Renault FT-17 tanks were also used in combined 
actions between French and Polish forces; these tanks were abandoned, captured later by the 
Red Army, and used as the basis for the creation of the Soviet tank industry which was built 
around the production of copies of the French tank. In fact, in the interwar period the Renault 
FT-17 was employed in several wars, including the Chaco War and the Spanish Civil War. 
These examples indicate that First World War tanks continued to be used after the conflict, in 
some cases against non-European forces. This use of tanks in combat against armies without 
tanks suggests a further justification for a comparison with war elephants.36 
 In the course of the Great War, the French produced around 800 Schneider and Saint-
Chamond heavy tanks and more than 2,500 Renault FT-17 light tanks by 11 November 1918, 
whereas the British built in total 2,818 tanks of all types. Seen in relation to the manufacture 
of artillery pieces and shells, the production costs of the tanks were relatively low by 
comparison.37 Thus, if for a moment we leave India with its large numbers of war elephants 
out of the equation, there are comparisons which can be drawn between elephants’ use in 
ancient warfare and tanks in the era of the Great War in terms of their numbers vis-à-vis the 
size and fiscal value of the other parts of the respective armies. Enough elephants and tanks 
were available that they frequently made important tactical contributions in combat and, at 
the same time, they could on occasions decide battles. Still, in both cases, historians are not in 
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agreement as to how ‘decisive’ both weapons systems were in specific battles in which they 
played an important role, and what the ultimate effect was on a campaign.  
 There is one final point in relation to a broad comparison which is worth making in 
relation to the employment of both weapons in war: namely, there are very few examples of 
elephant vs. elephant actions in the ancient world (they did occur but were the exception 
rather than the rule), while the First World War saw only one tank vs. tank engagement. At 
the Battle of Paraetacene in 317 BC, the army of Antigonus the One-Eyed took to the field 
against Eumenes. The former’s army deployed 28,000 heavy infantrymen, 5,500 light 
infantry, approximately 10,600 cavalry, and 64 war elephants, whereas the latter possessed 
17,000 heavy infantry, 18,000 light infantry, 6,300 cavalry, 10,000 archers and 125 war 
elephants. The overall result of the actual fighting could be summarized as a ‘draw’, although 
the following year there was a different outcome at the Battle of Gabiene, which lies in what 
is now Iran. At this battle, the numerical advantage was held by Antigonus, although he 
employed 65 elephants to the 114 of Eumenes; again, in terms of actual fighting, the results 
were initially inconclusive. In the first battle, the elephant vs. elephant combat was not 
decisive, but in the second, Eumenes elephants were decisively defeated despite their 
numerical superiority.38  
While these two engagements were large, pitched battles, the first tank vs. tank 
encounter in April 1918 was a small tactical engagement at Villers-Bretonneux. The Germans 
had attacked through the small French town with two A7V tanks, while four others were 
engaged to the south. The two German machines which had advanced into the town were 
engaged by three British Mark IV machines. The lead German tank knocked out two female 
tanks quickly, but was then hit three or four times by one male Mark IV, although the latter 
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was put out action by shell fire. The German machines then withdrew. The chief interest in 
the rather inconclusive action was the different lessons drawn by both sides. For the British, 
their after-action reports noted that the Germans might not make the same mistake in the 
future of employing small numbers of tanks, whereas the Germans were not in any position to 
organise a mass tank attack given that their complete inventory in the war was only 200 tanks, 
not to mention a host of organizational, training and supply problems.39 But both Paraetacene 
and Villers-Bretonneux demonstrate the difficulty of drawing clear lessons from the first 
instances of elephant vs. elephant and tank vs. tank combat.  
 
III. Tactical and Operational Functions of the ‘Weapons Systems’ 
In an attempt to compare war elephants with early tanks, it should be noted that many of the 
details surrounding ancient battles are contested by historians. This goes so far that one of the 
most famous military leaders who used elephants has enjoyed a reputation which is built in 
part upon a text fragment which is still being argued over. Whether Hannibal equipped 
elephants with towers hangs on the credibility of a fragment, which some historians of the 
antique consider a part of Polybiusʼ Historiae, while others have cast doubt upon it. As 
Hannibal has been described in many works as having led an army of invasion with 37 
elephants during the first phase of the Second Punic War, an army which also employed 
elephants during the Battle of Trebia in 218 BC and later in 202 BC used elephants 
unsuccessfully at Zama, the question of the use of towers on the backs of the animals is more 
than simply a minor detail.40 
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 Hence, given the lack of certainty about many of the central facts, the main section of 
this comparison will be based around the broad area of tactical and – to a lesser extent – 
‘operational’ functions. Where comparisons are perhaps of least value is obviously in battles 
where relatively few war elephants or tanks were employed. So, for this reason, probably one 
of the first recorded battles involving elephants which occurred outside India is of rather 
limited worth. At the battle of Arbela (also referred to as Gaugamelan) in 331 BC, the 
Persians under Darius apparently positioned 15 elephants at the front of their army, in the 
centre, as they prepared to do battle with Alexander. The Persians were able to deploy 200 
chariots, 40,000 cavalry, whereas Alexander had 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry. 
Elephants were unable to prevent the victory scored by Alexander because his attacks were 
fast and unexpected. This example could be compared with the first tank attack launched by 
the British Army on 15 September 1916 when 48 tanks were available at the start of the 
attack; of these, 36 reached the start-line; 30 actually left the start-line; and, since only 21 
were involved in any combat, the degree of success achieved was decidedly limited.41 
 But if we consider now the actual tactical functions of both weapons systems, the first 
observation which can be made lies in the surprise and shock effect which was caused by 
both weapons during an attack, especially at the point of contact. German troops on the 
Western Front sometimes reported the breakthrough of tanks, even when none had taken 
place.42 It is obvious that elephants caused similar outbreaks of panic during campaigns in the 
ancient world. Until serious counter-measures were developed, both war elephants and tanks 
caused severe problems for infantry when facing these new ‘weapons systems’, although the 
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first attacks were quite primitive. In the case of war elephants, it was discovered that 
aggressiveness could be created by giving the animals alcohol or through loud noises. 
Initially, elephants wore no protective armour and the driver could only attempt to frighten 
enemy troops, cavalry and chariots through the size of the beast, or have the elephant trample 
the opponents. There is a parallel of sorts with the early First World War tanks, which had 
extremely thin armour, with limited visibility for the crew members inside. The best method 
of attack was for the tanks to flatten barbed-wire, then crush opposing infantry or machine-
gun them. The psychological effect of the early attacks was often much higher than the actual 
tactical effect; and, it was sometimes heightened by the slow speed at which the tanks 
advanced. In the case of war elephants, the crushing of enemy infantry under their feet must 
have caused intense fear on occasions.43 
 Given the primitive form of the assaults conducted by war elephants and the first 
tanks, it was not long before effective counter-measures began to be developed. When facing 
war elephants, the simplest methods were either to hack off the animal’s trunk, or to cut 
through the tendons on the back of its legs, causing it to collapse. Another tactic was to use 
fire or create loud noises during battle in order to startle them. In anti-tank warfare on the 
Western Front, and in the two decades after the war, there were two basic approaches: first, to 
dig anti-tank ditches so that the machines would become stuck, or to create other forms of 
physical obstacles; second, to use artillery firing over open sights. Again, the comparison 
does seem to offer obvious parallels: in the case of both anti-elephant and anti-tank warfare, it 
was essential to have well-trained troops, either infantry willing to close with the elephants in 
combat, or artillerymen able to hold their nerve long enough to allow the tanks to come 
within close enough range to increase the chance of a direct hit.44 
                                                          
43 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. 8-9; Hammond, ‘Practical Considerations in British Tank Operations’, pp. 44-46. 
44 Kistler, War Elephants, p. 36; Fasse, Im Zeichen des „Tankdrachen“, pp. 130-46. 
21 
 
 In anti-tank warfare, there were other solutions developed by the Germans, such as 
the Flachmine 17, essentially a wooden box containing a main charge with spring percussion 
detonators. This form of defence against tanks had arguably a parallel in the antique. In the 
summer of 312 BC at the Battle of Gaza, Ptolemy came up with the idea of fixing iron hooks 
to chains (or, caltrops) in order to injure the feet of the elephant. Moreover, he directed his 
light troops not to kill the elephants but rather the mahouts. The method of injuring the feet of 
the elephants had the effect of creating chaos during the attack by Demetrius, whose cavalry 
was also affected by the panic which ensued. The impact on Demetrius battle-plan was 
immense, to the extent that he lost the battle, with his troops fleeing the field in blind panic. 
A further parallel can be seen in the tactic of spear-throwers aiming at the eyes of the 
elephants since German infantry shot at the vision slits of British and French tanks. A further 
parallel is in the use of fire: flamethrowers could be used in close combat against tanks, while 
in ancient warfare, in addition to the flaming arrows fired at elephants, there was the famous 
ʻflaming pigsʼ tactic, pigs coated with pitch, which was ignited, with the squealing animals 
then set among the elephants, who panicked and stampeded.45 
 What emerges here is offensive means being met with defensive measures, then 
improved offensive tactics, with the development over time of a spiral of measures and 
counter-measures, referred to by Fuller as the ʻconstant tactical factorʼ.46 For war elephants, 
three responses to the counter-measures were developed to protect them better. In order to 
help the animals cope with the noises of battle, elephants were trained to get used to shouts 
and the deliberate use of noise by the enemy. Second, direct and indirect protection were 
                                                          
45 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. 58-61, 90-133; for an order recommending that German troops aim their fire at 
British tanks’ vision slits, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, München, 11. Infanterie-Division, Bd. 
96, Chef des Generalstab des Feldheeres, Nr. II 73004 op. vom 21.12.1917 betr. Bericht der 119. Infanterie-
Division über Tankbekämpfung. For further details on the German anti-tank mine and ditches, see the pieces 
published in the journal of the US Army Corps of Engineers: ‘German Mine for Wrecking Tanks’, and ‘Anti-
Tank Defenses’, Professional Memoirs, 11 (Jan/Dec 1919), pp. 305-7, 422-29; and, Fasse, Im Zeichen des 
„Tankdrachen“, pp. 576-78, 625-26, 652-53. 
46 J.F.C. Fuller, ‘The Influence of the Constant Tactical Factor on the Development of War’, Journal of the 
Royal Artillery, 57 (July 1930), pp. 215-34. 
22 
 
improved: to combat swords directed against their legs, the solution was to place infantry 
around them to guard against such attacks, in addition to the metal bands wrapped around 
their legs for more direct protection. Further armour was hung over the elephant’s body, 
while additional protective armour was produced for the head and trunk. Third, the hitting 
power available to the elephant as a ‘weapons system’ was improved by increasing the 
number of spear-throwers or archers on the elephant’s back (a maximum of three on Indian 
elephants, four if housed in a tower), as well as attaching a sword or spikes to the trunk of the 
beast, which it could then swing against attacking infantry.47 
 These forms of protection had parallels in the First World War and in subsequent 
conflicts. It was discovered quickly that tanks were much more effective if employed in close 
cooperation with infantry, so that the enemy of the tanks – either enemy infantry or artillery, 
which aimed their fire at tanks – could either be destroyed or suppressed. In the last year of 
the war, the first serious attempts were made to create ‘armoured infantry’, infantry which 
travelled in Mark V* tanks, the first ‘panzer-grenadiers’ in military history. Memoranda 
written by staff officers of the British Tank Corps demonstrate that the importance of infantry 
accompanying tanks during an attack was recognized very early on. When in late 1917 the 
first warning was made about the threat of a German tank unit appearing on the Western 
Front, it was suggested that one element of a successful anti-tank defence would be to 
separate the infantry from the attacking tanks.48 
 Another phenomenon where one can identify parallels between war elephants and 
tanks is in the capture of numbers of each respective ‘weapons system’. There are numerous 
examples of captured elephants being used in battles against their former owners. Kublai 
Khan, the 5th Mongolian Emperor, and First Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty in China, 
reputedly captured around 1272 AD more than two-hundred elephants from the King of Mien 
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and Bangalla. However, on occasions, those armies which had captured elephants were 
unaware of the proper principles for their employment.49 In the First World War, German 
Beutepanzer played a relatively limited role on the Western Front due to their modest 
numbers. Still, by November 1918, the Imperial German Army tank force consisted of 170 
captured British Mark IV tanks, two Medium A ‘Whippet’ tanks, at least one French tank, 20 
A7V machines, and a couple of prototypes. The very limited experience gained did lay the 
basis in the 1930s, however, for the formation which was to become the Panzertruppe.50 
 It is harder to compare the operational use of elephants and tanks than their tactical 
functions since it is difficult to identify a level of war between tactics and strategy in the 
ancient world, or an operational role for tanks in the Great War. Nonetheless, the capacity to 
conduct extended marches, as well as the relative strength of both weapons in relation to 
other arms, are subjects worthy of closer examination. According to one source, before 
Hannibal began his march across the Alps, his army was composed of 100,000 men, 12,000 
horses, 58 war elephants, as well as thousands of animals carrying equipment and supplies. 
When he commenced his march, he left some elephants behind with his brother Hasdrubal as 
part of a garrison.51 Although there are many examples of larger formations of elephants, 
there was a similar disproportionality between infantry, artillery and the tank forces in both 
world wars, comparable in very broad terms with the elephant forces of antiquity. During the 
First World War, the strength of the tank arm in relation to combatant strength never rose 
above 1.51% in the British Army in France.52 
 Elephantsʼ march rates compared quite favourably with those of interwar tanks and, 
without doubt, exceeded those of First World War tanks. According to Spenser Wilkinson, 
during Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps his average march rate up the valley of the Rhone was 
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rather less than nine miles a day, while his opponent Scipio was unlikey to have managed 
more than four or five miles a day. In other words, Hannibal was not slowed down by his 
elephants. 53  This is noteworthy, given the logistic challenges which an elephant force 
imposed upon a commander: an elephant required between 70-150 litres of water and 150-
300 kg of feed daily. It has been calculated that a fully ‘crewed’ elephant (assuming a ‘crew’ 
of five) was equivalent to the cost of supplying twelve cavalrymen and their horses.54 
 When it comes to logistics, which relates closely to the operational capability of both 
elephants and tanks, both weapons systems were able to demonstrate impressive capabilities. 
A British officer, serving in India in the mid-nineteenth century, recalled in a memoir how 
much elephants could carry, a capacity which will have not been significantly different in 
antiquity. They were able to carry six men, complete with their arms, ammunition and 
bedding, as well as rations. He also noted that they were able to lift heavy guns, while if the 
pioneers cut the roots of trees, the elephants would finish the job of felling them.55 The 
capacity of tanks to increase logistic capability on the Western Front was demonstrated in the 
preparations for and during the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. There were 54 supply 
tanks used in the battle, but also 110 ʻsledsʼ were built to be pulled behind the supply and 
fighting tanks, thus increasing the overall resupply capacity.56 
 Further parallels can be identified in relation to the pre-battle deployments of both 
elephants and tanks. In the case of elephants, they were often placed in a line in the centre, 
together with light infantry, to break up the enemy infantry; and they could be deployed on 
the flanks to frighten and disrupt enemy cavalry attacks. British tank attacks in the First 
World War also involved close cooperation with infantry, which followed the tanks to 
support them in attacks on German defensive positions; an advance guard of tanks would 
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often lead the assault, followed by one or more waves. The similarity lies in the fact that poor 
deployments made before the battle, which did not take account of enemy defences or plans, 
could not usually be corrected once the attack had commenced.57 While these deployments 
might be dismissed as mere tactics, there were obvious ‘operational dimensions’ to the role of 
both weapons in some battles. At the Battle of Zama (October 202 BC), Scipio Africanus 
eschewed the typical checkerboard deployment for his cohorts, laying out rows of cohorts 
with corridors between them through which the elephants would run. Through a variety of 
strategems, he induced them to charge through the corridors, enbling his forces to pelt the 
elephants with spears and arrows from two sides; the ensuing chaos caused them to charge 
off the battlefield.58 By January 1918, the Headquarters of the British Army Tank Corps had 
begun to differentiate between tactical objectives, strategical localities (e.g., bridges) and 
administrative centres (e.g. enemy headquarters) for tank attacks.59 The emerging operational 
possibilities of tank formations were further identified in Fuller’s famous memorandum 
usually referred to as ‘Plan 1919’; it could also be seen for the first time in embryonic form at 
the Battle of Amiens (August 1918).60 
 Moreover, it can be noted that both weapons were clearly important enough that their 
surrender was a demand which was often made as part of peace negotiations, something 
which suggests that their significance extended beyond even ‘operational functions’ right up 
to the level of strategy. In the wake of Scipio Africanusʼ victory at the Battle of Zama in 202 
BC, the Romans imposed peace terms, which were to be administered by Scipio, that 
Carthage pay an indemnity of 10,000 silver talents in fifty annual installments, Massinissa 
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(the King of Numidia) was to have his ancestorsʼ land returned, the Carthaginians were to 
carry out no attacks outside their territory without the agreement of Rome, and the hand-over 
of all war ships (with the exception of ten triremes) and war elephants was ordered.61 Despite 
the disputed combat value of the elephants in Hannibal’s possession, they were important 
enough that their surrender was at the very least understood as a symbolic measure which 
would help preserve the peace. This aspect of the settlement after Zama can be compared 
with some of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles. As well as the ‘war guilt’ clauses, 
according to Articles 171 and 198 of the Treaty, the new German Republican armed forces 
were forbidden from possessing armoured cars, tanks or aircraft; and, during the course of 
1919/20, the 59 tanks still remaining in the inventory were broken up for scrap.62 
 
IV. The Two ‘Weapons Systems’ as Symbols of Power 
A comparison based on our starting point – namely, that the art of war in the antique and 
early twentieth century possess certain commonalities – must be developed beyond tactics 
and field strategy. Once again, there is a further area in which some parallels can be identified: 
the respective roles of the two weapons as symbols of power. This symbolism can not only be 
seen in victory parades and other events staged by rulers, but also through the way in which 
both weapons systems were portrayed via cultural artefacts for wide distribution among the 
people, celebrated, and as a result became part of collective memory and societal identity. 
Indeed, as a symbol of power, both weapons systems found occasionally a use as an 
instrument for the carrying out of public executions. 
 In many ways, war elephants anticipated the ‘modernity’ of the tank as a means by 
which military power could be communicated in both a real and symbolic fashion. In states 
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which possessed organized armed forces, especially in the Roman Republic, parades of 
soldiers fulfilled different functions. From the most simple perspective, they could 
demonstrate state power in public in two ways: on the one hand, through the display of the 
military power of the ruler and/or the ruling elite, it could be demonstrated to anyone who 
might have entertained thoughts of overthrowing state authority that it would be inadvisable 
to do so; on the other, a feeling of security could be communicated to the citizens of Rome. A 
further function of such public parades was to celebrate victories, so that the citizens could 
develop a sense of pride in their soldiers, while the victorious generals and their commander 
could bask in the glory of victory.63 
 The significance of war elephants and tanks in public appearances was that they broke 
the usual order of traditional parades. Elephants smelt differently and were, of course, 
capable of deficating during such events, but at the same time were impressive due to their 
sheer size; they achieved a new level of symbolism because they communicated the conquest 
of nature by man; and, they could be decorated and contribute to the dramatic colour of such 
events. During Alexander’s return from India to Babylon in 325 BC, he placed himself within 
a large group of elephants. They presented the ultimate symbol of military power. They 
fascinated the inhabitants of cities, many of whom had never seen an elephant before. In the 
first half of the twentieth century tanks fulfilled a similar role because they moved parades 
away from the era of cavalry and horse-drawn transport: they communicated the mastery of 
new technology, the inventiveness of an industrial nation and the capacity of its industry. 
Like elephants, they removed the previous pomp and grandeur of parades as they threw up 
dust, making a huge noise as they drove past. They symbolized total war because the efforts 
of factory workers as much as engineers had led to the creation of each individual tank. 
Tanks appeared in numerous victory parades after the Great War, such as in Paris on 14 July 
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1919, or in London on 19 July 1919, unseating the cavalry from its earlier place of honour in 
pre-1914 celebrations of military power.64 
 It is worth noting that occasionally in history, the ancient world could seemingly meet 
with modernity where military parades were concerned. In May 1935 an order was placed by 
Iran for Czechoslovak TNH tanks, the forerunner of the Panzerkampfwagen 38(t), a tank 
seized by the Germans when they occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Fifty of these 
machines had been delivered by May 1937. Yet, apparently, they were mainly used for show 
during the annual military review. While they were concentrated in an Imperial Mechanized 
Brigade, their training was poor, with the crews frequently stalling the machines. The real 
intention was to have them serve as a ‘palace guard’ for the Pahlavi dynasty in Tehran. The 
lack of interest in their actual military value would suggest that the reason for their purchase 
was to impress the population as to the might of the rulers, hinting at a throwback to the role 
of Sassanid war elephants as a means of impressing the dynasty’s subjects.65 
 As part of the relationship between ‘weapons system’ and military power, the 
communication of military and state values was not merely a function of parades and other 
forms of public celebration. Cultural artefacts played a role in the diverse forms of the 
symbolism of power, with the respective populations owning specific objects.66 The weapons 
were thus immortalised and celebrated through various artefacts. In the case of war elephants, 
there were numerous examples of images appearing. A coin minted in 280 BC in Pergamum 
shows an Indian elephant of Seleucus I of Syria. A painted plate from Capena in the style of 
the Etruscans around the third century BC shows an Indian elephant, its mahout, and the 
howdah (castle) on its back, ‘crewed’ by two Macedonian warriors. Military decorations 
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likewise incorporated images of elephants. One also finds pictures of war elephants in Roman 
mosaics on the floors of buildings.67 Most famously, to commemorate his victory over Porus 
at the Battle of Hydaspes (326 BC), Alexander had a coin minted with his head on one side 
and an image of an elephant on the other.68 
 The representation of British tanks during and immediately after the First World War 
shows a similar saturation of public perceptions and national emotions through artefacts. Just 
like the form of an elephant, the lozenge shape of British tanks in the First World War was 
immediately recognisable, while at the same time infused with various connotations, such as 
the nation’s inventiveness in wartime. 69  For these two reasons, tanks appeared in 
advertisements for soap and cigarettes.70 In Britain, a public campaign on the home-front to 
increase the sale of war bonds was hugely successful due to the mock battles staged by battle-
scarred tanks, while mock-up tanks appeared in towns which the tank war bond ʻroad showʼ 
was not able to visit.71 Needless to say, tanks were photographed frquently during the war, 
with the images published in newsapers and books. The enthusiasm which tanks could 
unleash can be seen in some of the newspaper reporting shortly after the opening of the Battle 
of Cambrai. The title page of the Daily Graphic on 29 November 1917 shows four large 
photographs of tanks moving across the battlefield and in a destroyed village, indicating the 
insatiable appetite of the readers for any visual material related to tanks.72 
 One of the differences between war elephants and tanks within the context of the 
comparison is that, during the First World War, the opportunities for the distribution of 
imgaes of the tank were much greater. Still, the extended period of time in which war 
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elephants played a role on the battlefield suggests that within the broad parameters of the 
comparison the point is, nonetheless, a valid one. The argument here is the variation in the 
means of communication of the image: the image of the weapon appeared on military 
uniforms, in objects for use in a citizen’s house and on everyday items such as coins, or in 
advertising. The elevation of the weapon system to the status of a cultural artefact highlights 
the psychological impact of the ‘weapons system’ within societies in two different historical 
epochs. The inclusion of the weapon as part of the cultural memory of ancient and modern 
societies suggests that the two ‘weapons systems’ served a much broader symbolic function 
than that generated by the more common hand-held weapons.73 
 The final point of comparison which can be made concerns the employment of both 
weapons systems as a means of execution through which potential criminals or those wishing 
to challenge authority were to be dissuaded through the gruesome nature of the public 
‘performance’ of the sentence. Some illustrations show the use of elephants for public 
execution, with one of the feet of the animal placed on the chest or head of the convicted 
individual. The death sentence is then carried out by the weight of the elephant crushing the 
miscreant.74 Although very few documented examples are known of the use of tanks as a 
means of execution, one Uzbek warlord in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, a certain Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, apparently tied those who had fallen foul of him to tracks of a captured 
Russian tank, in order to crush them in front of his followers in a demonstration of authority 
in a fashion quite similar to the employment of an elephant as an executioner.75 
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V. Analysis 
Where then does this comparison of war elephants and tanks leave us in the final analysis? At 
the outset, three central issues were raised surrounding the apparent similarities between the 
employment of war elephants and early tanks. First, the question was posed as to why Major-
General J.F.C. Fuller, the leading theorist of armoured warfare in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
never drew a comparison between war elephants and tanks in his writings, despite his belief 
that the basic principles of strategy had not changed since antiquity. Second, on the basis of 
the parallels between elephant and tank warfare, can any conclusions be drawn about 
principles of war or battle which can be identified in both ancient and modern warfare? Third, 
and building here upon the second question, are there any broader conclusions which can be 
drawn from the comparison about the nature of strategy in general? To answer these 
questions, the issues around historiography will be tackled before considering commonalities 
between war elephants in ancient and early tanks in modern warfare. 
 
(i) Historiographical Context 
It is important to begin with a central conundrum surrounding the comparison, namely, the 
failure of J.F.C. Fuller to draw a comparison between war elephants and tanks, despite his 
strong interest in the precursors of the new war machine. This is all the more important given 
his argument that the campaigns of Alexander could teach the contemporary soldier much, 
‘because war is an art which, whatever be the period in question, is based on the same 
principles, and only their application varies from date to date.’ 76  While his book on 
Alexander, and his final work, a study of the generalship of Julius Caesar, were largely 
concerned with ‘grand strategy’, the discrepancy is worth noting.77 For in his description of 
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the precursors of the tank in his book Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918 (1920) Fuller 
provided a detailed description of human inventions; his main point of focus was medieval 
battle carts, as well as the invention of the battle tractor in 1888. The omission of elephants is 
surprising when one reads that he identified four problems which had repeated themselves 
over 4,000 years of history: 1.) how one hits a soldier from a distance; 2.) how one can 
approach enemy lines; 3) how one can hit an opponent over a short distance; and, 4.) how one 
can protect oneself during a battle.78 This analysis would seem to have provided a good basis 
for a comparison of war elephants and tanks. 
Nonetheless, he did on one occasion come closer to the comparison in Armament and 
History, writing directly after the Second World War. In this work, he described the war 
elephant as the ‘shock arm’ in the era of Alexander the Great, even considering their 
employment as ‘the greatest innovation of all’. But one of the reasons why he refrained from 
taking the comparison any further was that Alexander, whose campaigns he described as 
‘blitzkriegs’, generally built his success around his cavalry and never employed pachyderms 
in war. Fuller’s reading convinced him that elephants were generally unreliable, but at the 
same time he remarked that ‘how elephants were combined with infantry and cavalry is not 
known’.79 Certainly, then, lack of historical knowledge must be put down as one explanation 
for his failure to draw the comparison. But there were three other significant reasons. 
In the early period of the development of the tank, when Fuller was General Staff 
Officer 1st Grade on the staff of the British Army Tank Corps, soldiers thought very precisely 
in terms of the nineteenth-century roles of infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers. This 
emerges from wartime Tank Corps memoranda authored by Fuller in which he considered, 
for instance, the Mark V tank as offering ‘almost an exact parallel to the use of heavy cavalry 
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in the Napoleonic era’, in essence, as a weapon suited to the counter-offensive.80 Fuller’s 
theory of tank warfare was, furthermore, based around the idea that machine-power was more 
efficient than muscle power. Such a view naturally dove-tailed well with what has become 
the dominant narrative – that the invention of the tank represented a revolution in warfare.81 
Furthermore, other sources written during the war identify the precursors of the tank as the 
cavalry armies of Ghengis Khan, the chariots of antiquity and medieval knights, who – like 
tanks – carried armoured protection.82  
To add to these reasons, it was the case that in Fuller’s lifetime military history had 
not advanced to a point where concepts such as ‘the revolution in military affairs’, military 
effectiveness, weapons systems or comparative and cultural-historical approaches had come 
into general usage. While military history had started to consider the societies from which 
armies sprang, and was open to making use of ancient history to discuss contentious points, 
the main motive remained to extract principles from history which might improve battlefield 
performance in the future. Since comparisons of war elephants and tanks were seen as a 
product of the ‘popular imagination’, they were often dismissed as ‘misleading’ and as a 
notion which was not worth taking seriously.83 
But the most significant reason for Fuller’s unwillingness to draw a comparion 
between war elephants and tanks probably lay in the internal army politics surrounding the 
debate over mechanization in the 1920s and 1930s.84 Those who supported the argument that 
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the army required mechanization tended to argue from a very linear interpretation of history. 
Progressive officers, such as George M. Lindsay, saw animals in war as representing 
‘congestion and immobility’ through their role in pulling chariots and supply wagons. 
Writing in 1926 in his capacity as Inspector of the Royal Tank Corps, Lindsay argued that 
animals pulling vehicles were extremely vulnerable, so that the emergence of cavalry 
represented a major new epoch in the development of warfare. He considered that the 
mounted archer armies of the Parthians were the best example of the combination of 
firepower and mobility; subsequently, even more successful were the mounted archers of the 
Mongols in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. But his main argument was that the horse had 
become increasingly vulnerable through the course of history, so ultimately it would need to 
be phased out in favour of armoured fighting vehicles.85 
This said, in the ‘history of the tank idea’, Lindsay was also willing to acknowledge in 
1926 that among the precursors of that idea (the central elements of which were firepower, 
mobility, protection and morale), in addition to the linking of shields by the Assyrians, 
Egyptian and Romans, Cyrus’s wagon towers and Chinese battle wagons, one could also 
identify the elephants of Darius, Porus, the Romans and the Carthaginians.86 One officer went 
even further than Lindsay, arguing in the same year that tank and anti-tank tactics were 
‘almost identical’ when compared to the employment of elephants in battle.87 The problem in 
the identification of the war elephant as a precursor to the tank for the advocates of 
mechanization was that this argument could be turned against them by those who were afraid 
of the implications of military reform. In his address to officers of the British Army’s 
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experimental mechanized force in September 1927, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), General George Milne, was quick to state that the tank ‘is not in the slightest degree 
of itself a new idea’. It was merely ‘a new method of carrying out an old idea’ – and that idea 
had, of course, already been demonstrated by the elephant ‘in the days of Hannibal’.88  
What terrified Milne, who occupied the post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
from 1926-1933, was that he equated the arguments of the mechanical warfare enthusiasts 
with the destruction of military tradition. Most revealing in this respect are some of the 
marginal comments written by Milne on a report prepared by Lindsay in 1926 on the future 
of the Royal Tank Corps. While the CIGS was prepared to accept that Lindsay was arguing 
along the right lines, next to the statement that there was a need to break away from the 
regimental system and create uniformity in training, Milne wrote: ‘No I can’t agree with this. 
You want to abolish all tradition’. 89 Thus, it is the historical context of the battle over 
mechanization in the British Amy in the interwar period which provides the central 
background to Fuller’s approach to interpreting the role of the war elephant in ancient history. 
It seems more than likely that he would have been unwilling to consider the elephant as a 
precursor of the tank because this was a rhetorical device used by the critics of mechanization 
to call into question the claim that the tank was a radically new weapon which had 
overthrown conventional notions of warfare and, hence, required new methods and tactics. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that there is a further dimension to the 
historiography surrounding this comparison, namely, earlier historical writing on ancient 
warfare. If one takes a historian such as Johann Gustav Droysen, accomplished scholar 
though he was, his descriptions of the employment of elephants in Alexander’s campaigns 
served the creation of a vibrant and dramatic narrative, intended to transport the reader into 
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the drama of the events.90 In addition to the criticism which was levelled at his errors in the 
use of source material, and the suspicion that he sympathised with the winners in history, 
there were obvious ulterior political intentions behind his work.91 A very different approach 
to writing on the antique in Germany came with the publication of Hans Delbrück’s first 
volume of his ‘History of the Art of War’. He lurched, though, in the opposite direction, 
casting suspicion almost on principle over every type of source, often dismissing the 
descriptions of classical writers with more than a touch of dogmatism. 92  Not until the 
advances in historical analysis which came after 1945 was it possible for a more accurate and 
balanced picture of the role of war elephants to emerge. 
 
(ii) Transepochal Comparative Assessment 
These are important points of clarification as, otherwise, it might be less credible to return to 
Fuller’s claim that the art of war was based upon the same principles in the antique as it was 
in the twentieth century. But how strong is the evidence for this? In this comparison, what has 
been identified is much less principles for the conduct of war (such as surprise, mobility, or 
economy of force) as Fuller understood them. What has been discovered, in contrast, are 
general phenomena which can be identified as recurring in military history since antiquity. 
Rather than ʻprinciplesʼ, these are military processes or phenomena which evolve over time, 
or occur within certain phases of military-technical development.  
 The first observation to emerge from the comparison is the obvious similarity in the 
continual struggle for the tactical advantage during combat. In both cases, comparable 
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measures were undertaken to reduce the superiority of war elephants and tanks. During the 
initial attack, passive defensive measures were employed – caltrops were used to stop 
elephants, anti-tank ditches and mines to halt tanks. An attack could also be disrupted by 
more active measures: loud noises or fire could be used to frighten elephants, whereas to 
break up a tank attack the enemy infantry needed to be separated from their tanks. Defenders 
aimed to strike with hand-held weapons or projectiles against the vulnerable points of both 
weapons systems. In the case of war elephants, these points were the tendons at the backs of 
their legs, the eyes, the underbelly, whereas for tanks it was the vision slits, the weak armour 
at the sides and rear, and the tracks.93 
The second of point of similarity, and central to this comparison, is the basic concept 
of combined-arms cooperation. War elephants, like tanks, were always part of a larger 
formation, which often consisted of infantry, cavalry, archers and, at times, catapults and 
chariots. While both war elephants and tanks created the notion among civilians and military 
officers alike of a ‘wonder weapon’, 94  success was dependent in most cases upon the 
practicability of the overall plan, the quality of the respective units and combined-arms 
cooperation.95 When faced by an intelligent commander, war elephants could fail when out-
manoeuvred by enemy cavalry and infantry, or if they were poorly positioned in relation to 
the opposing forces. In the first half of the twentieth century, the situation was similar in the 
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94 Both Ernest Swinton and Winston Churchill were guilty of this type of wishful thinking, even after the First 
World War, proclaiming in their war memoirs that much had been possible, but that most reprehensible had 
been the squandering of surprise through the first attack. E.D. Swinton, Eyewitness (London, 1932), pp. 260-99; 
W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 (London, abridged & rev. edn, 1931), pp. 306-19, esp. 318. Of 
course, surprise had been a consideration during the early phase of development. Field-Marshal Sir John French 
reacted positively in June 1915 to Swinton’s original idea, noting that there appeared to be ‘considerable tactical 
value in this proposal… particularly if the production of these machines be a surprise to the enemy.’ The 
National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter, TNA), WO 158/831, Field-Marshal J.D.P. French (GHQ, 
France) to the Secretary, War Office, London, 22 June 1915. 
95 For a historical overview of the subject in relation to mechanized war, see Jonathan M. House, Combined 
Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS, 2001). 
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case of tanks. Tank formations could achieve success when they were employed in 
combination with aircraft, infantry, artillery and specialist troops, such as engineers; but, at 
the same time, they could do little to rescue a commander who had deployed his various arms 
poorly before the start of an offensive. Where both elephants and tanks achieved their most 
spectacular success was often when they were facing less prepared and inadequately 
equipped opponents.  
 If we search for common principles to be found in elephant and early tank warfare, 
further observations can be offered, which go beyond simple rules for employment on the 
battlefield itself.96 A third phenomenon which can be identified is that of measure/counter-
measure/up-armouring (i.e., Fuller’s ‘constant tactical factor’) which involves increases in 
firepower in the ‘weapons system’, followed by counters from the opponent, then 
improvements in protection. War elephants were first employed with little or no armour: as 
the threats increased, they were equipped with armour protection, as well as better platforms 
from which to deliver missiles. In the First World War, the armour on British tanks was 
discovered to be too thin, so a process of up-armouring began.97 Initially, British tanks were 
divided into ‘male’ and ‘female’, the male tanks carrying a 6-pounder gun, while female 
tanks were armed with machine-guns only. The French Renault FT-17 was armed either with 
a 37mm cannon, or a machine-gun. But it was the Red Army which first succeeded in 
developing a version of the tank which mounted both weapons in the turret.98 
 A fourth example of parallels is in the creation of a new breed of ‘elite soldiers’ to 
crew the weapons system, but also to combat it, leading in essence to a qualitative leap in 
training. Mahouts gradually gained a privileged position, allowing them to wear finely 
                                                          
96 See Table 1 below for the presentation of the comparison in tabular form through division into four categories, 
albeit with the limitation of ‘early tank warfare’ to the First World War.  
97 For an historical overview of the continual increase in the tank’s main armament, ‘Appendix I: Growth of 
Gun Power’, and for armour protection, ‘Appendix II: The Quest for Greater Protection’, in Ogorkiewicz, Tanks, 
pp. 247-65, 266-81. 
98 Main & Searle, ‘Tanks in Palestine and Russia, 1916-1921’, pp. 186-87. 
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coloured clothes, a public display of their importance within an army. In the German 
Panzertruppe in the Second World War, a distinctive black uniform was worn, providing an 
indication of elite status.99 The threat posed by both weapons systems to entire armies lent 
those tasked with combating the threat, likewise, a certain status. Around 170 BC, the Greeks 
formed history’s first anti-elephant corps, complete with spiked helmets and shields, which 
were designed to pierce the elephant’s hide. In the Second World War, the Japanese Army 
had little answer to Allied medium tanks since they only possessed light tanks; thus, special 
tank-hunting teams were trained to attack tanks, often using satchel charges. In urban warfare 
and close country in Europe, hand-held anti-tank weapons transformed close combat between 
infantry and tanks, with the Americans using the bazooka, the British the PIAT, and the 
Germans the lethal Panzerfaust.100 Huge doses of courage and self-sacrifice were required in 
assaulting elephants or tanks, often requiring a willingness to accept almost certain death. 
 A further aspect which would appear to demonstrate the viability of the comparison is 
the inherent flexibility of the weapons systems. Elephants showed themselves to be 
remarkably flexible in their methods of combat: they could employ their tusks against enemy 
infanty and other elephants, their trunks could pick up opposing soldiers and throw them, 
they could employ their bulk in charging opponents, as well as trample them to death. Tanks 
could crush infantry with their tracks; they could also flatten obstacles; and they could turn 
360 degrees, by putting one track into forward gear, the other into reverse, thereby collapsing 
trenches and fox-holes, burying the occupants alive. Projectiles fired from the elephants (both 
spears and arrows) represented a further means of killing opponents; in the case of tanks, 
shells fired from the main cannon could be used against opposing tanks, or cannister against 
infantry; machine-gun fire could decimate enemy infantry caught in the open. Both weapons 
                                                          
99 Kistler, War Elephants, pp. 22-23; Martin Windrow, Tank and AFV Crew Uniforms since 1916 (Cambridge, 
1979), pp. 64-79. 
100 Kistler, War Elephants, p. 148; John Weeks, Men against Tanks: A History of Anti-Tank Warfare (London, 
1975); and, US War Department, Military Intelligence Division, Japanese Tank and Anti-Tank Warfare, 
RESTRICTED, Special Series No. 34 (Washington DC, 1945).  
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systems also possessed considerable ‘operational flexibility’ in that they could negotiate 
mountain paths, and be transported or swim across rivers. Each weapons system created 
combat power far in excess of the numbers of men involved in its operation, recalling the 
claims of the ‘father’ of Operations Research, the British mathematician, Frederick 
Lanchester, creator of the ‘square law’, who argued that an additional machine-gun added to 
an aircraft did not double its combat capability, rather it quadrupled it.101 
 To conclude, sixth, what does the comparison reveal about the transepochal nature of 
strategy and similarities between ancient and modern warfare? Thus far, the analysis has 
concentrated upon the employment of the two weapons systems in combat and field strategy. 
But if we can accept that Carl von Clausewitz was the first theorist to unlock the basic DNA 
of war, then the ‘Clausewitzian trinity’ of ‘government-army-people’ becomes quite 
significant for this comparison.102 Principles for the conduct of battle only seem to explain 
part of the nature of war. Strategy also includes the population supporting any particular war 
effort. A ‘weapons system’ intensifies the dynamic link between the people and a campaign 
(or a war). If a weapons system demonstrates a form of fusion between the crew and the 
weapon in battle, within the wider context of war the weapons system creates a link between 
the population and its armed forces. While the commander still retained respect, the 
appearance of the weapons system ʻdemocratizedʼ warfare by creating a symbol which 
elevated crew heroism over the figure of the general.103  
                                                          
101 For the original theory, see F.W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Army (London, 
1916). Further discussion and details of the range of literature available can be found in: Ronald L. Johnson, 
Lanchester’s Square Law in Theory and Practice, unclassified student research report, School of Advanced 
Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1990); Richard H. Peterson, ‘On the Logarithmic Law of Attrition and 
its Application to Tank Combat’, Operations Research, 15 (1967), pp. 558-59; James G. Taylor, Lanchester 
Models of Warfare, 2 vols. (Arlington, VA, 1983); and, T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Prediction and War: The Use of 
History to Evaluate and Predict the Outcome of Armed Conflict (Fairfax, VA, 1985). 
102 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Berlin, 5th edn, 1905), Book I, ch. 1, pp. 20-21. For analysis and 
comment on the ‘Clausewitzian trinity’, see: Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s “On War”: A Biography (London, 
2007), pp. 177-82; Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London, 2002), pp. 44-71; and, Edward J. Villacres & 
Christopher Bassford, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, Parameters, 25 (Autumn 1995), pp. 9-19. 
103 Useful perspectives on the question of heroism in war can be found in René Schilling, Kriegshelden: 
Deutungsmuster heroischer Männlichkeit in Deutschland 1813-1945 (Paderborn, 2002). 
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Thus, the crew of the weapon leave the traditional heroism of the soldier behind, 
taking on a new form of ‘technicized heroism’. In a sense, individuals become part of the 
square law; they receive a degree of independence in decision-making; hence, a ʻweapons 
systemʼ as opposed to a weapon democratizes warfare but – paradoxically – creates a new 
military elite. Yet, successful employment of the weapons system, or its defeat, could elevate 
the commander to a new heroic level. The dynamic interaction created between the weapons 
system and the citizen becomes part of the upward spiral of the process of ‘up-armouring’, 
creating an additional dynamic to the tactical, battlefield effects of the weapon. It is the trinity 
of government-army-people who become locked collectively in a struggle for tactical 
superiority as the mobile weapon requires ever-increasing upgrades in firepower and armour. 
The Clausewitzian trinity applies to preparations for war, but also the ongoing impact of 
unfolding campaigns. The spiral of up-armouring a weapons system connects a society itself 
with combat. It can be argued, therefore, that there are internal dynamics around the trinity 
which transcend historical epochs. 
 
VI. Final Thoughts 
This transepochal comparison of the similarities between war elephants and tanks has sought 
first and foremost to suggest the need for a reconsideration of the way in which the history of 
the tank has often been framed. In a sense, it has sought to throw a different light on much of 
the standard literature which generally considers the tank as a breakthrough in military 
technology, a tendency often directed by the early technical considerations surrounding the 
design and development of the first machines.104 But this perspective has led to the dismissal 
                                                          
104 In a British General Staff document of early 1916, the machines under development were referred to 
variously as ‘the caterpillar cruiser’, the ‘armoured fort’, or ‘landships’. TNA, WO 158/831, SECRET. Note on 
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the Landships Committee, which had investigated the original idea, ‘which adapts the peculiar qualifications of 
the caterpillar mode of traction to the transport of a species of armoured turret across cultivated and uneven 
ground’. TNA, WO 158/831, Secretary, Major, General Staff, Experiments Committee, Minute, 16 June 1915. 
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of the suggestion that parallels can be identified between tank and elephant warfare. Part of 
the problem has been the claim made by J.F.C. Fuller that there are inherent principles for the 
conduct of battles, campaigns and wars which do not change throughout history.105 While this 
may or may not be true, it has prevented historians from recognizing that there are specific 
military phenomena which can be found in different historical epochs which are remarkably 
similar. It is the identification of clusters of military concepts in separate eras which can lay 
the basis for transepochal comparative history, providing that approximately similar 
processes can be found in each era. 
 If this comparison has considered the evolutionary cycle of one weapons system, 
whose fate was sealed by the invention of gunpowder, against another still in existence, this 
is not to say, of course, that there was a point of absolute historical extinction for the war 
elephant. Its logistic role in war continued, in fact, into the era of the tank. During the First 
World War, elephants requisitioned from zoos were used on the Western Front and in cities 
for moving heavy items.106 In the fighting in Burma in the Second World War, both the 
Japanese and the Allies made use of elephants in order to keep their logistic systems 
functioning in the inhospitable terrain. Even today, the Kachin Independence Army employs 
elephants for supply purposes in its fight against the government forces in the mountainous 
Kachin region of Myanmar (formerly Burma) which borders China’s southern Yunnan 
province.107 By virtue of the same logic, in the early stages of the Syrian Civil War which 
broke out in 2011, improvised armoured vehicles reminiscent of those of the early twentieth 
                                                          
105 J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London, 1926), esp. pp. 13-16, 208-29. 
106 See here the photograph of an elephant in the charge of German soldiers moving a log in a French town in 
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century could be seen in combat action during the conflict.108 So, it should be borne in mind 
that elements of one type of warfare can continue in one geographical area and cultural 
region when it has long since ceased in another.  
 It follows, then, that this comparison raises two fundamental issues for military 
history, the first relating to the question of end points in specific tactical-technical cycles. In 
the case of this transepochal comparative exercise, in very broad terms warfare in Western 
Europe has been compared with warfare in the Mediterranean region. There would, however, 
be scope for a more global approach in which individual developmental cycles are considered 
which did not run parallel to one another. Yet while some historians have been quite 
persistent in their calls for a global approach to military history which rejects ‘Western-
centric bias’, considering the interaction of military with other social and cultural institutions, 
they have been rather less specific as to how such studies should be undertaken.109 The first 
step here would be to recast one of the central ideas underpinning Oswald Spengler’s Decline 
of the West (1918),110 and consider whether, in military terms, certain civilizations have 
maintained a form of military-cultural integrity over a significant period of time. Any attempt 
to write global military history would require some understanding of specific ‘warfare 
regions’, when they were founded, and how long they lasted, and what their specific 
characteristics were. Such an approach challenges one of the arguments of global historians 
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that a form of global periodization is required to ‘enable’ the future writing of global 
history.111 
 The second fundamental issue relates to the implication in histories of military 
technology that the subject matter is really about invention and turning points caused by the 
appearance of new weapons.112 In fact, the origins of modern military history in English 
language studies has lain to a great extent in the influence of J.F.C. Fuller in propagating the 
view that military organizations have been inherently resistant to change. If he had a 
tendency to universalize individual examples of genuine conservatism, his work chimed well 
with some of the early and rather misguided post-1945 works of military sociology. Yet, this 
comparative analysis suggests that historians need to be careful about assuming that ‘military 
innovation’ is synonymous with a completely new invention, or that warfare follows a natural 
‘upward path’, driven primarily by new technology.  
 Summing up, it should be emphasized that a transepochal comparative approach to 
the history of war is one of the most taxing of analytical exercises. Not only does it present 
significant challenges given the difficulties associated with comparing phenomena which 
occur within different historical eras, these can often be located within different social, 
geographical and cultural contexts. Moreover, a comparison of ancient and modern warfare 
faces the problem of the lack of reliable knowledge in many areas, including the origin of 
certain types of military technology.113 This said, the comparative study presented here does 
suggest that strategy in war is governed by its own internal laws, regardless of cultural or 
                                                          
111 See here, Jerry H. Bentley, ‘Cross Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History’, American 
Historical Review, 101 (June 1996), pp. 749-70. The argument here is not to dismiss ‘global periodization’, but 
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geographical area, or historical epoch. While any comparison of phenomena in antiquity with 
later periods faces the challenge of the impossibility of equal levels of accuracy and detail,114 
the exercise forces the historian of the modern period to reconsider not only existing 
historiography from a new angle, but also assumptions about the nature of strategy, 
modernity and innovation. Above all, it encourages greater awareness of the dangers of 
adopting assumptions of ‘linear development’ in military history; and, finally, it teaches that 
the history of technology should, at times, be subordinated to the wider history of strategy.  
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Appendix 1: Comparative Table – War Elephants and WWI Tanks 
 
TACTICAL FUNCTIONS  
War Elephants Tanks 
Training: necessary for mahout to control elephant in 
battle; knowledge of animal required 
Training: tank driver required training, together with 
other crew members 
Flexibility: elephants flexibile in combat; they use 
their trunks, feet, bulk to crush and tusks to impale  
Flexibility: tanks employ cannon and/or machine-gun; 
their tracks can crush barbed-wire or troops 
Survivability: elephants could survive multiple hits by 
spears and arrows 
Survivability: WWI tanks could survive multiple hits 
from infantry small arms 
Command and control: command elephants employed 
in order to better coordinate groups 
Command and control: British and French introduced 
specially equipped signal tanks in 1917 
Increase in firepower: gradually more spear-throwers 
placed on elephant, archers provided with howdahs 
Increase in firepower: quality of machine-guns 
improved during WWI; thereafter better main guns 
Up-armouring process: armour introduced to protect 
legs, head and body of elephant 
Up-armouring process: tanks increased in armour 
during WWI & after; weak spots reinforced with steel 
COUNTER-MEASURES  
War Elephants Tanks 
Passive defensive measure: caltrops to injure feet of 
elephants (difficult for them to free themselves) 
Passive defensive measure: Germans used anti-tank 
mine against British and French tanks 
Projectiles: concentrated hail of spears and arrows at 
elephants 
Projectiles: Germans employed artillery firing over 
open sites and Smk ammunition 
Blinding/disabling: spear-throwers and archers aimed 
at eyes of elephants or mahouts 
Blinding/disabling: German infantry taught to fire at 
vision slits on Allied tanks 
Attack on vulnerable parts: infantry sought to attack 
legs, underbelly, point below eyes 
Attack on vulnerable parts: Germans identified 
weakest parts of tanks and sought to fire at those 
Disruption of attack: loud noises to frighten elephants 
(trumpets), use of fire, aim to cause a stampede 
Disruption of attack: separate tanks from supporting 
infantry 
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS  
War Elephants Tanks 
Pre-battle deployment: in centre of army to disrupt 
infantry, cause panic, or on flanks to disrupt cavalry 
Pre-battle deployment: in large operations led assault 
on defensive lines, killed infantry, or exploited gaps 
Logistics: elephants able to carry many and supplies 
overlong distances 
Logistics: fighting tanks and supply tanks able to 
transport troops, fuel, ammunition and other supplies 
Pioneer functions: elephants able to lift heavy 
equipment, including artillery pieces, and fell trees 
Pioneer functions: tanks could flatten obstacles; 
specialist vehicles (e.g. bridging) began development 
STRATEGIC & SOCIETAL DIMENSIONS  
War Elephants Tanks 
Peace treaties: surrender of elephants demanded as 
part of peace treaties 
Peace treaties: Imperial Germany required to destroy/ 
surrender tanks after 11/11/1918 & Versailles Treaty 
Parades: captured elephants paraded through streets of 
cities as a means of celebrating a victory 
Parades: Allied victory parades in 1918 and 1919 
featured tanks as symbol of victory 
Elite status: special clothing for mahouts and 
organisation of elephant corps 
Elite status: own distinctive insignia, and emergence 
of individual esprit de corps 
Commemoration: war elephants portrayed on insignia, 
coins, vases, floors of Roman villas 
Commemoration: WWI saw tank teapots, model tanks, 
illustrations in journals, photographs in newspapers 
 
 
